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Is Military Justice Sentencing on the March? Should it be?
And if so, Where should it Head? Court-Martial Sentencing
Process, Practice, and Issues
I. Introduction
This is an opportune time to review sentencing in the
military justice system and identify issues that warrant
review. To start, military justice is in the news. A number of
wartime cases placed it there, including those arising out of
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and the first Fort
Hood shootings. Concerns about sexual assault in the
military have kept military justice in the news. It belongs
there.
Military justice is an essential national security tool.
That is because the system is designed to address both
justice and good order and discipline, the capacity of a unit
to accomplish its mission and do so in accordance with law.
Sexual assault offenses illustrate this point. As in the civil-
ian context, an assault in the military raises questions of
justice and victim impact; however, in the military it may
also have security impact. Where, for example, the perpe-
trator and victim are in the same unit or chain of command,
the ability to accomplish the military mission as well as the
morale and welfare of the unit may suffer. This dual pur-
pose of military justice should be kept in mind as one
considers the sentencing process and issues presented.1
Finally, for the reasons stated above, there are multiple
panels that have just reviewed, or are reviewing, the military
justice system at this time. The military justice system may
be on the verge of significant change, including in the area
of sentencing. The Systems Response Panel, a congressio-
nally mandated commission, was tasked with completing
a review of the military justice system in the context of
sexual assault. Its report was released in June 2014. The
Military Justice Review Group is a Department of Defense–
directed effort to examine the Uniform Code of Military
Justice from cover to cover. A legislative proposal and report
from this effort are due in 2015. In addition, the Defense
Legal Policy Board, Subcommittee on Military Justice in
Combat Zones, produced a report in May 2013 regarding
‘‘cases of U.S. service members alleged to have caused the
death, injury or abuse of non-combatants in Iraq or
Afghanistan.’’ Moreover, the Joint Service Committee,
a committee of judge advocates from each of the services,
reviews the Code on an annual basis and makes recom-
mendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President
on changes to the Code, including those that can be
implemented by executive order. This process continues as
well.
This article starts with a sketch of the military justice
system to orient readers. Understanding that structure, the
article then describes the sentencing process for special and
general courts-martial. The article follows by identifying
two core military sentencing questions: First, should com-
manders have authority to grant clemency? Second, should
the military justice system adopt sentencing guidelines?
With respect to each topic presented, the article does not
attempt to answer the questions nor offer prescriptions.
Rather, it seeks to identify the principal fault lines around
which debate should, or will likely, fall. The article next
presents ‘‘nutshell’’ introductions to additional sentencing
matters that may warrant review as applied in the military
context, including the handling of collateral matters, and
the relationship between age and culpability. However, for
the reasons stated, these issues are not presented in detail
here.
II. The Military Justice System
A brief sketch of the military justice framework is helpful if
one is to understand when and how sentencing issues arise
and how these issues might differ from civilian practice. To
start, the military justice system is directed to good order
and discipline as well as to criminal justice. Thus, the
Manual for Courts-Martial, which contains the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (the Code), the Rules for Courts-
Martial, and Military Rules of Evidences, states in its pre-
amble that
[t]he purpose of military law is to promote justice, to
assist in maintaining good order and discipline in
the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effective-
ness in the military establishment, and thereby to
strengthen the national security of the United States.
As a result, the Code includes the authority to utilize
non-judicial punishment (NJP) as well as judicial punish-
ment and sentencing. Non-judicial punishment is autho-
rized by Article 15 of the Code. It is generally addressed to
minor disciplinary breaches, such as arriving late to for-
mation, or perhaps to more serious disciplinary breaches by
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good soldiers who warrant a second chance. NJP is meted
out by unit commanders, usually at the company, battalion,
and brigade level without judicial review. Commanders of
naval vessels may also have this authority. Those who have
served as platoon commanders will remember well stand-
ing outside the Battalion Commander’s office on a Friday
afternoon of a liberty weekend with ‘‘their Marines’’ or
‘‘their soldiers’’ waiting to see the Commanding Officer,
who would then quickly review the evidence and pronounce
sentence. Where NJP is concerned, the commander is
indeed prosecutor, jury, and judge.
However, the analogy is only partly apt, because NJP is
an administrative disciplinary process, not a criminal or
a judicial one. As a result, the potential punishments and
consequences are limited. NJP can, among other things,
result in the forfeiture of pay, restriction to certain limits,
and reduction in grade. From the servicemember’s per-
spective, this may seem a lot like a criminal sentence. But
NJP does not result in a criminal conviction, and in many if
not most cases a junior servicemember’s career can recover
from the imposition of a single NJP. Moreover, if a servi-
cemember wants to contest the facts presented at NJP or
challenge the imposition of punishment, he may refuse
NJP and request trial by court-martial (with limited
exceptions).
The military tribunal used to adjudicate criminal accu-
sations against U.S. servicemembers is the court-martial.
Congress has established the subject matter and personal
jurisdiction for trial by court-martial, and provided for three
types of courts-martial: summary court-martial, special
court-martial, and general court-martial. The essential dif-
ferences between categories are found in the seniority of
the commander authorized to convene the court-martial
(the convening authority), the size and composition of the
court, and the scope of permissible punishments the court
is authorized to adjudge. A summary court, for example,
may sentence a servicemember to no more than one month
of confinement. For ease of reference, and with some
exception, one might equate a summary court-martial with
a misdemeanor court, and a special or general court-martial
with a felony court, although the analogy is not exact. One
might likewise use as a rule of thumb that a general officer
must convene a general court-martial.
The Code incorporates both common law offenses, like
murder and sexual assault, as well as traditional military
offenses, like insubordination and desertion. The Code also
incorporates federal criminal law and the law of armed
conflict, and assimilates state law through the Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act. Personal jurisdiction is estab-
lished based on service status, rather than the nature of the
crime, which means a servicemember may be charged with
an offense under the Code for conduct occurring on or off
base, on or off duty, and in or out of the continental United
States. In some cases, there may be concurrent jurisdiction
with state or federal authorities, raising the prospect that
the forum selected may depend on any number of factors
including comparative sentence exposure between military
and local jurisdiction. Selection of a court-martial forum
can also have as much to do with how prosecutorial dis-
cretion is exercised, as it does with the nature of the offense.
For example, an offense like drug use might appropriately
be referred to NJP or any of the three types of courts-
martial, depending on the circumstances. However,
offenses like murder will invariably be referred to a general
court-martial.
In the case of a special or general court-martial, a servi-
cemember has a waivable right of appeal and mandatory
review before a service Court of Criminal Appeals (e.g., the
Army Court of Criminal Appeals, the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, etc.), provided the sentence includes one
year or more of confinement or a punitive discharge (i.e.,
a Bad-Conduct Discharge, a Dishonorable Discharge, or in
the case of commissioned officers, a Dismissal) or both.
The service Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) are
comprised of judge advocates designated by the senior
lawyer in each service to serve as military appellate judges.2
Generally, these courts sit as panels of three. Of note, CCAs
have fact-finding authority as well as the authority to review
questions of law. Moreover, in addition to reviewing sen-
tences for legal accuracy, CCAs ‘‘may affirm only such
findings of guilty, and the sentence or such part or amount
of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and
determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be
approved’’ to ensure it is appropriate.3 This latter clause
refers to what is known as sentence appropriateness review.
Its exercise is discretionary and thus generally beyond
subsequent appellate review, except in cases of ‘‘manifest
injustice.’’4
From a CCA, appeal on questions of law can be taken by
the Appellant or the Government to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF). The USCAAF
‘‘may specify or act on any issue concerning a matter of law
which materially affects the rights of the parties.’’5 As with
the lower courts in the military justice system, the All Writs
Act applies to the exercise of USCAAF jurisdiction—which
is to say, it is available in aid of existing jurisdiction, but
cannot expand the Court’s jurisdiction. In addition, juris-
dictional provision is made for interlocutory government
appeals to the CCAs and the USCAAF.
The USCAAF is comprised of five federal civilian
judges. In theory, the Court is a manifestation of the con-
stitutional principle of civilian control and oversight of the
military in the context of the justice system. As a result,
judges may not have retired from the active duty military
(i.e., served twenty years or more and received a pension),
in which case they would in theory be subject to recall by the
Secretary of Defense. However, prior service is permitted,
and consequently, retired reserve officers are permitted to
serve on the Court. Moreover, in 2014, the Court’s enabling
statute was amended by Congress to authorize the
appointment of retired military officers as judges seven
years after retiring from active duty. Thus, the question
presents whether the Court, if it is composed in part or in
whole of retired military officers, will be perceived as
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a civilian rather than military court by the appellants who
appear before it and by the public at large.
Because the Congress created the court pursuant to its
Article I legislative authority and located the Court in the
Department of Defense ‘‘for administrative purposes only,’’
rather than within the Article III judiciary, the Court is an
Article I court. More precisely, it is a court created pursuant
to Article I, placed in Article II, exercising what would look
to most lawyers like Article III judicial powers. As with an
Article III Circuit Court of Appeals, decisions of the
USCAAF may be appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States.6
The Court follows the judicial guidelines of the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, the administrative
institution of the Article III judiciary. Judges of the Court
are paid at the rate of Article III appellate judges. However,
unlike Article III judges, they serve fifteen-year terms
rather than with life tenure. (Congress is free to create such
terms of office for inferior courts it sees fit to establish
outside of Article III.) Further, the Court is a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction rather than general jurisdiction. Its juris-
diction is worldwide in geographic scope, but otherwise
limited to appeals arising in the military justice system, and
then only appeals from Special and General Courts-Martial
for which a sentence of at least one-year confinement and/
or a punitive discharge is adjudged. Even here, the exercise
of jurisdiction is generally discretionary, ‘‘for good cause
shown.’’ However, the Court ‘‘shall review’’ cases certified
by the Judge Advocate General of a service or where the
sentence is death.7
The USCAAF docket is comprised of questions arising
under the system’s primary legal and enabling documents:
The Constitution (1st, 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments), the
Code, the Rules for Court-Martial, and the Military Rules of
Evidence. Whereas the sentence is reviewed in all cases
submitted to a service Court of Criminal Appeals, the
USCAAF entertains a small percentage of cases addressing
sentencing issues. As measured solely by volume, appeals
tend to address: (1) allegations of improper sentencing
argument by Trial Counsel;8 (2) the scope of the rules
permitting the introduction of extenuating and mitigating
circumstances, e.g., rehabilitation potential;9 (3) the scope
of permissible collateral matters on sentencing;10 and, (4)
questions regarding the proper calculation of sentence
exposure.11 The Court does not exercise supervisory
authority over inferior military courts in the military justice
system.12
Nine points of sentencing interest may help to identify
distinguishing characteristics of military sentencing as well
as distinctions between military and civilian practice.
First, there is no right to a jury in the military, and thus,
no right to a jury of one’s peers. The Supreme Court has
held that Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, providing
that ‘‘[t]he trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury’’ is inappli-
cable to military commissions or court-martials.13 However,
a military accused does have a statutory right to elect trial by
members, the rough military equivalent of a jury, or trial by
military judge alone. Moreover, unlike federal civilian
practice, a military accused can elect to be sentenced by
members rather than the judge alone, although the forum
for a contested findings case cannot be changed for sen-
tencing. However, because sentencing in the military jus-
tice system occurs on a bifurcated basis, an accused can
plead guilty before a military judge and elect members for
sentencing.
As noted, juries in the military justice system are
referred to as members or as Member Panels, that is,
members of the court-martial. Members do not comprise
a jury of one’s peers or a random cross-section of military
personnel. To the contrary, pursuant to Article 25 of the
Code, members are not supposed to be peers, but must be
senior to the accused in grade (e.g., Major, Lieutenant
Colonel, Colonel) or rank (one’s date of promotion within
a pay-grade). Members are also selected by the convening
authority based on criteria established in the Code, which
include experience, education, training, length of service,
and judicial temperament. An enlisted accused can elect to
be tried by an enlisted panel, in which case the panel will
consist of one-third enlisted personnel senior in grade to
the accused as well as two-thirds commissioned officers.
Otherwise, the panel will consist entirely of commissioned
officers.
The size of a court-martial panel will depend on the type
of court-martial, but generally a special or general court-
martial will consist of no fewer than three members or five
members, respectively. With some exceptions, unanimous
verdicts are not required. However, where the government
seeks the death penalty, a panel must consist of no fewer
than twelve members on both findings and sentence.
Moreover, the determination on both findings and sentence
must be unanimous.
All of which means that a servicemember’s sentence can
be adjudged in one of three ways: by judge alone, by officer
members, or for an enlisted servicemember by one-third
enlisted members and two-thirds officer members. In
addition, the accused may enter into a pretrial agreement
with the government that may cap the ultimate sentence
approved by the convening authority, regardless of what is
adjudged at court-martial. Such agreements are signed by
the convening authority and approved by the military judge
presiding over a court-martial. These agreements are also
not disclosed to members so as not to impact the sentence
that might be adjudged at trial. In the case of sentencing by
military judge, the sentence limitation of such agreements
is not revealed until the judge sentences the accused. Pre-
trial sentencing agreements are usually tied to an agree-
ment to plead guilty. Indeed, as in civilian practice,
a majority of military justice cases are resolved by plea
agreement. Although central statistics are not kept, and an
appellate court is a reductive location from which to make
such a judgment, there is reason to believe a high majority
of military justice cases are resolved by plea, although
probably not as high a percentage as in civilian practice.
Moreover, in military practice, plea colloquies and deals are
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subject to a more searching inquiry by the court, to ensure
that they are voluntary, knowing, and accurate, than in
civilian practice.14
Second, courts-martial are not standing courts. They are
convened by the commander in his or her capacity as a con-
vening authority for the specific purpose of hearing a case or
a series of cases. That means that if on appeal a finding or
sentence is reversed and remanded with a rehearing autho-
rized, a new court-martial must be convened. By definition
that will involve new members and likely a new military
judge who have not had the benefit of hearing the trial. For
this reason, and others, the military Courts of Criminal
Appeals are generally authorized to conduct sentence reas-
sessments without requiring a court-martial rehearing.15
This authority may, consciously or subconsciously, prompt
appellate courts to lean toward sentence reassessment rather
than rehearing.16
Third, in contrast to some civilian and military justice
systems overseas, neither the convening authority nor the
appellate courts in the military system have the authority to
increase a sentence; adjudged findings and sentences may
only be approved or reduced. However, where a finding and
sentence is overturned and a rehearing authorized (in other
words, in the vast majority of most successful appeals), an
accused may in some cases face the prospect of a higher
adjudged and approved sentence.17
Fourth, when one talks about military discipline, mili-
tary justice, or the military justice system, it is important to
be precise about what one is addressing. The distinctions
here are important; precision is warranted. With military
justice debates, advocates sometimes talk past each other,
referring to two different concepts within the same system
without realizing it. This is known in legal vernacular as an
‘‘apples and oranges’’ problem. Take the statement, ‘‘the
commander is essential to military justice.’’ The com-
mander is essential if one is talking about non-judicial
punishment. NJP is entirely a tool of command discipline
and discretion. But if one is talking about the commander’s
role in clemency, there is room for debate, which is
explored below.
Fifth, military discipline is principally a matter of lead-
ership and culture. The most effective form of leadership is
leadership by example, not leadership by court-martial.
Most matters of military discipline are addressed through
counseling, leadership, and command, not military justice.
Further, where military justice is invoked, most disposi-
tions are nonjudicial in nature. By quantifiable example, in
2013 the Army had 42,407 NJP, compared to 380 summary
courts-martial, 373 special courts-martial, and 714 general
courts-martial.18 NJP includes punishment, but not sen-
tencing or sentences. Military justice sentencing only arises
in the context of courts-martial.
Sixth, commanders play a central role in the military
justice process. Recent congressional debate and legislation
has centered on the role of the commander in two areas:
First, should the commander, with the advice of judge
advocates, or should judge advocates alone make the
decision to bring charges in the military justice system?
Second, should commanders have the authority to grant
clemency to a servicemember following court-martial con-
viction? This sentencing topic is reviewed below.
However, commanders—by which is meant those
senior officers with authority to convene courts-martial—
also play an indirect as well as a direct role throughout the
military discipline continuum from NJP to court-martial
sentencing. It is the commander who generally sets the
command climate in which a unit operates. Is the unit led
through inspiration and with respect, or through fear and
with intimidation? Are military courtesies observed? Are all
members of the command treated with dignity and respect,
or are subtle or not so subtle forms of harassment and
hazing tolerated?
The commander controls the command’s investigative
resources and budget along with the wherewithal to initiate
or energize investigation. It is the commander, for example,
and not the judge advocate, who will determine in
a deployed context whether the mission is better served by
deploying an MP or a criminal investigator for security or
investigative purposes. And just as the commander can set
the command climate in an infantry unit, he or she can do
so in the manner in which law enforcement approaches
their work. Does the commander trigger an investigation
when an incident occurs? Does the commander demand
answers, or wait for staff briefings? Are the necessary
resources allocated to the investigative function? In garri-
son, such steps may be automatic, especially where an
incident occurs outside the unit and is either reported or
observed by military or civilian law enforcement authori-
ties. But in the field, it is the commander who must decide
how to balance his finite resources and allocate these
resources among force protection, patrol, and criminal
investigation.
Commanders also play a direct role, with the advice of
staff judge advocates, as convening authorities in the court-
martial process. It is the commander who initiates an
Article 32 investigation, the very rough equivalent of
a civilian preliminary hearing. It is the commander who
initiates and in most cases orders pretrial confinement. It is
the commander who brings charges against an accused, or
alternatively chooses not to charge or to proceed on the
basis of administrative sanction or NJP. It is the com-
mander who does or does not enter into a pretrial agree-
ment. It is the commander who selects and designates
court-martial members, if trial by members is elected. It is
the commander who must approve the expenditure of
money for defense or government experts and the travel of
witnesses. It is the commander who must review and
approve the court-martial. And it is the commander who
may, in his or her discretion, grant clemency on findings or
sentence to the accused.
Of course, this must all be done in a manner that is not
directed to a particular court-martial outcome or in a man-
ner that will viewed by members as constraining their dis-
cretion. Inappropriate command influence on the outcome
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of a military justice investigation or trial is known as
unlawful command influence (UCI), which can lead to
reversal with or without prejudice.19 At the same time, as
indicated earlier, the military justice system is replete with
and, in fact, could not operate without, lawful command
influence.
Seventh, the military justice system is global in scope. It
is intended to apply anywhere U.S. forces or naval vessels
are deployed, including in combat or on the high seas. That
means the sentencing process, like the court-martial itself,
is supposed to function as effectively in the field under
combat conditions as it does in garrison. As one can
imagine, there are special challenges that arise in such
context, such as gathering the members and witnesses, as
well as the presentation of sentencing evidence through
those witnesses.
Eighth, it is the sentence, and not the offense, that keys
the door to appellate review. The question arises whether
the threshold for appeal should be pegged to a sentence
threshold of one-year confinement and/or a punitive dis-
charge. Although it is generally the case that serious or
complex offenses may generate more appellate issues, that
is not necessarily the case. After all, appellate courts are
charged with reviewing questions of law, which arise in the
context of trial practice or pretrial investigation, whether or
not a particular sentence is assessed.
Moreover, if appellate courts are in part intended to
provide a uniform standard to the application of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, it might seem appropriate to
review all cases and not just those at a sentence threshold.
Moreover, in the case of the USCAAF, the Court plays the
added function of providing civilian oversight to the court-
martial system. Surely, the principle of civilian control of
the military applies regardless of sentence threshold.
Moreover, the Court’s docket is sufficiently flexible to
handle the additional cases that a lower sentence threshold
would bring. Finally, where the sentence sets the threshold
for obtaining appellate review, the government retains the
ability through pretrial agreement to avoid appellate review,
should it desire to do so.
Of course, there are arguments against the automatic
appellate reviewof all special or general courts-martial aswell.
After all, Congress did not adopt such a model. First, there is
the principle of finality, which allows both the Service and the
servicemember to move on after court-martial in a case not
resulting in a punitive discharge or lengthy confinement.
Second, by extended analogy, the one-year threshold could be
viewed as essentially equivalent to the distinction in civilian
life between misdemeanors and felonies, and thus, an
appropriate line of demarcation for an appeal of right. Fur-
thermore, there is concern that if all cases were reviewed as
a matter of right, appellate delay would ensue.
Ninth and finally, courts-martial are presided over by
military judges. And, in the cases of trial before military
judges alone, it is the judge that adjudges the sentence.
Military judges are judge advocates selected by the senior
lawyer in each service and designated to sit as trial or
appellate judges. Generally, military judges will hold the
rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel, although there are
majors designated for this role as well as general officers.
Military judges do not hold tenure; however, assignments
are generally understood to last for three years, at which
point a judge can return to line duty as a judge advocate.
Once designated as a judge, trial assignments, or panel
assignments on a CCA, are determined by the Chief Judge
of the relevant circuit or court. Fitness reports, however, are
generally written or reviewed by the senior lawyer in each
service, known as The Judge Advocate General, and are
based on officer qualifications rather than judicial criteria.
All of which means that for purposes of sentencing,
military judges will generally not have the same years of
experience as civilian life-tenured trial judges. Nor are the
structural safeguards of impartiality and independence as
strong as those provided by tenured office. On the other
hand, military judges will have served all of their careers as
military officers, and through a self-selecting process, are
likely to have spent much if not most of their service time in
the military justice field. Further, a military judge will more
rapidly garner sentencing experience as well as perspective
on appropriate and comparative sentences because they
preside over courts of limited jurisdiction and thus repeat-
edly see and rule on the same offenses. Likewise, of those
courts-martial occurring in combat theaters, five offenses
comprised the majority of U.S. Army cases from 2003
through 2012, by a wide margin: making a false official
statement, offenses relating to alcohol, larceny of nonmili-
tary property, violation of general orders, and assault con-
summated by battery.20
III. Military Sentencing Process
Prior to sentencing, the government and the accused are
entitled to put on sentencing cases. This can include the
introduction of evidence in aggravation, extenuation, or
mitigation. Victims of offenses under the UCMJ, as in the
case of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, have ‘‘the right to be
reasonably heard’’ before the court-martial prior to sen-
tencing. In the case of the military, additional aggravating
and mitigating factors beyond those familiar to civilian
practice may include testimony regarding the crime’s
impact on unit cohesion, good order and discipline, and the
military character (quality of service) of the defendant. The
accused is also entitled, but not obliged, to make an
unsworn statement before the court, which is subject to
rebuttal but not to cross-examination.
The Manual for Courts-Martial recognizes five philoso-
phies or purposes behind sentencing, as reflected in the
standard Benchbook instruction:
1. Rehabilitation of the wrongdoer,
2. Punishment of the wrongdoer,
3. Protection of society from the wrongdoer,
4. Preservation of good order and discipline in the
military, and
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5. Deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who know of
his crimes and his sentence from committing the
same or similar offenses.21
Sentencing is also based on the premise that an accused
should be sentenced based on the particular offense and the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding that
offense. There are no sentencing guidelines in the military
justice system. However, there are maximum sentences and,
for some offenses, mandatory minimum sentences to con-
finement. For example, the offense of premeditated murder
includes a mandatory minimum of imprisonment for life.
In addition to confinement, military sentences can
include fines, as well as military-specific punishments like
confinement at hard labor, forfeiture of pay, reduction in
grade, and punitive discharge (Bad-Conduct or Dishonor-
able Discharge) or, in the case of officers, dismissal from
the service. Sentencing is also imposed in aggregate. That
means the fact-finder is not required to designate a partic-
ular punishment or term of confinement for a particular
offense, if multiple offenses are charged. As a result, where
findings are reversed in part, appellate courts must apply
a legal presumption that they can determine what sentence
would have otherwise been imposed absent the overturned
finding, or return the case for a sentence rehearing. In the
case of a punitive discharge or dismissal, in accordance
with service regulations and the Manual for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M. 1113), a punitive discharge is generally not executed
until a servicemember’s appeals are final, which accounts
for the possibility that a servicemember will be returned to
their status quo ante following appeal.22 However, as the
posttrial process along with appeals can take a number of
years, this has led on occasion to posttrial inmates receiving
pay and benefits following conviction and while confined
and awaiting discharge. As a result, the Code was amended
in 1996 to provide that a military member sentenced to
confinement for more than six months and/or sentenced to
a punitive discharge shall not receive pay and benefits.
Once a sentence is adjudged at court-martial and the
record of trial authenticated by the military judge, the
record is sent to the convening authority for approval. It is
at this stage of the court-martial process that the convening
authority has an opportunity to offer clemency, a subject of
present controversy as well as the subject of the next
section.
IV. Sentencing Issues and Fault Lines
Recent public and congressional attention on military justice
has focused on the use of clemency in military sentencing.
However, the third rail of the military justice sentencing
debate revolves around the question of sentence consis-
tency—between services and between offenders—and thus,
whether the military justice system should include some
form of sentencing guidelines. This section presents both
issues. The goal is not to answer the questions and prescribe,
but rather to inform the debate and in neutral manner set the
stage for the articles that follow.
A. Clemency
Since the advent of the UCMJ, the Code has provided
authority to convening authorities to grant clemency on
findings and sentence as part of the convening authority’s
review and approval of courts-martial. Such authority has
existed in some manner in U.S. military justice practice
since the Articles of War of 1776 and George Washington at
Valley Forge.
In the UCMJ, clemency authority is found in Article 60,
which until the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014
provided:
(a) The findings and sentence of a court-martial shall be
reported promptly to the convening authority after the
announcement of the sentence.
. . .
(c) (2) Action on the sentence of a court-martial shall
be taken by the convening authority or by
another person authorized to act under this
section. Subject to regulations of the Secretary
concerned, such action may be taken only after
consideration of any matters submitted by the
accused under subsection (b) or after the time
for submitting suchmatters expires, whichever
is earlier. The convening authority or other
person taking such action, in his sole discre-
tion, may approve, disapprove, commute, or
suspend the sentence in whole or in part.
(3) Action on the findings of a court-martial by
the convening authority or other person acting
on the sentence is not required. However,
such person, in his sole discretion, may—
(A) dismiss any charge or specification by
setting aside a finding of guilty thereto;
or
(B) change a finding of guilty to a charge or
specification to a finding of guilty to an
offense that is a lesser included offense
of the offense stated in the charge or
specification.
Pursuant to Article 60, the now convicted accused has the
right to petition the convening authority for clemency
before the convening authority takes action to approve the
findings and sentencing. Usually, the petition is filed before
the same convening authority that brought the charges in
the first place.
Whereas heretofore, Article 60 permitted a convening
authority to dismiss the findings with prejudice or disap-
prove the sentence in its entirety and award ‘‘no punish-
ment,’’ in practice clemency is most often exercised in
sentence mitigation, if it is exercised at all; however, here as
elsewhere the absence of statistics makes empirical obser-
vations difficult. In some circumstances, a convening
authority might reduce a sentence in response to govern-
ment misconduct or error in the course of trial (for exam-
ple, undue appellate delay). In rarer circumstances,
a convening authority might reduce a period of confine-
ment or mitigate a reduction in rank in recognition of
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exemplary combat service. Rarest of all is the exercise of
clemency resulting in the dismissal of a finding of guilt, as
a matter of grace, as opposed to the legal recommendation
of a staff judge advocate.23 However, in part because the
military justice system is decentralized and designed to be
exercised at the convening authority and command level,
centralized statistics have not been kept on the exercise of
clemency. Thus, empirical data on the actual exercise of
clemency is sparse, and anecdotal or reductive evidence
tends to drive debate. Thus, the military justice system
would be well served by a system that better tracks trial
inputs and outcomes, provided it is a subtle enough system
to identify the sorts of distinctions between cases involving
the same offenses, but that result in different sentencing
and clemency outcomes.
What is the debate?
The theory behind clemency authority is twofold. First,
it provides for military necessity and exigency by giving the
commander authority to eliminate or reduce a finding or
sentence in order to return a soldier to duty and, if neces-
sary, the battlefield. This is not purely theoretical, or the
stuff of movies like The Dirty Dozen, in which a group of
rogue and violent criminals is promised clemency in return
for undertaking a ‘‘suicide’’ mission behind German lines.
Recall that the Code was drafted in the wake of World War
II and during the course of the Korean Conflict. There were
approximately 1.7 million courts-martial during World War
II.24 That is a lot of courts-martial, potentially resulting in
a lot of soldiers being taken off the line to serve sentences.
Now consider that the Germans have broken through in the
Ardennes Forest during the Battle of the Bulge, or that the
North Koreans are streaming south to trap the Americans
in the Pusan perimeter. In such contexts, the use of clem-
ency authority for both findings and sentences makes some
sense. A commander might well clear the stockade or brig
to defend the line.
Recall as well that the military justice system is intended
to serve as a disciplinary tool to uphold good order and
discipline and not only to adjudicate criminal responsibility
and mete out punishment. For that reason a commander
might use some measure of clemency as a tool to recognize
past meritorious service and thus set an example for other
soldiers. Wielded wisely, the use of clemency as grace can
inspire performance and enhance morale and discipline. Of
course, if wielded unwisely, it can dramatically have the
opposite effect. There is surely a moral and optical differ-
ence between granting clemency to a good soldier who got
in a bar fight and a rapist.
The second theory behind clemency authority is rooted
in democratic principle, including recognition that the
state, in the form of prosecutorial authority may, indeed,
will overreach. As James Madison stated in the Federalist
Papers, ‘‘If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself.’’ Therefore, the clemency
authority, like the President’s pardon power or a state gov-
ernor’s commutation power, recognizes the state’s potential
to overreach, perhaps especially where national security is
concerned. Therefore, the executive—the President, the
Governor, or in military context the commander—is granted
authority to mitigate sentences as well as findings. Because
the commander is closer to the circumstances surrounding
an offense as well as the factors that might mitigate in favor
of clemency, the argument is that the commander should
retain the authority rather than a more senior and central
authority, or indeed the Commander in Chief.
In the drafting of the Code, the risk of overreach was an
acknowledged and in some cases a specific concern. Indeed,
many provisions in the Code were adopted to guard against
the potential of government overreaching and to provide for
military discipline without sacrificing servicemembers’
rights. Of course, there is always room for debate, then and
now, on just where the line falls and should fall. But there is
no question the Code includes provisions to protect servi-
cemembers’ rights for this very purpose. Article 31 rights
warnings, for example, which are roughly similar to but
more robust than Miranda Warnings, were included in the
Code sixteen years before Miranda out of concern that mil-
itary grade and power differentials could potentially coerce
servicemembers into acts of involuntary self-incrimination.
Likewise, the Code prohibits what is known as unlawful
command influence, an effort by a command or a com-
mander to influence the outcome of a court-martial outside
the bounds of appropriate command influence as authorized
and recognized in the Code.
As a final example, the Code provides servicemembers of
any grade and regardless of means, military defense counsel
free of charge through appeal to the Supreme Court. As
a result, at courts-martial the government and the accused
are usually represented by counsel of equivalent grade, cali-
ber, and training, acting with the zeal and diligence of
a professional military officer. Thus, clemency authority
should not be viewed in the abstract, or solely through the
lens of the role of the commander, but also as one of
a number of provisions in the Code that were intended to
safeguard servicemembers’ rights while also advancing good
order and discipline and the military mission.
However, there are arguments against clemency gen-
erally, or clemency in certain cases, as well. First, because
Article 60 grants clemency authority to convening author-
ities generally, by definition it will be exercised by many
commanders representing diverse backgrounds, different
services, and varied grades. This can and does result in
inconsistent applications, notwithstanding seemingly sim-
ilar circumstances. Given the prescripts against unlawful
command influence, a more centralized policy on the
exercise of clemency could be problematic and is generally
eschewed.
Second, to the extent clemency was intended as a safe-
guard against prosecutorial overreaching, the Code in
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practice provides multiple safeguards to protect the rights
of servicemembers and has placed those safeguards in the
hands of military judges and ultimately federal appellate
court judges at the USCAAF. In addition, the service Courts
of Criminal Appeal have sentence appropriateness author-
ity and can review the factual underpinnings of convictions
appealed as a matter of right. Moreover, the civilian judges
of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces function
entirely outside the military hierarchy. The case law of these
courts includes such doctrines as multiplicity, multiplica-
tion of charges (addressed to duplicative charging as well as
overcharging), as well as the principle that sentences should
not be highly disparate in closely related cases.25
Third, clemency authority is unbridled. It is, or was, an
available authority in the case of murder and rape, and not
only military ‘‘misdemeanors.’’ Thus, as a matter of theory,
it is available in circumstances and in cases where the
government has not overreached and where the com-
mander could not possibly want or desire to return a mili-
tary member to duty, including in cases where the member
has received an adjudged punitive discharge. The Dirty
Dozen aside, is it realistic or appropriate to suppose that
a commander will release violent offenders in the case of
military necessity? This leads to a fourth and related
concern.
The clemency authority has been used in unintended
ways, that is, outside the theories presented above, includ-
ing by commanders substituting their judgment for that of
court-martial fact finders regarding the credibility of the
evidence on questions of guilt or innocence. Clemency was
not intended as a substitute for trial and the careful evalu-
ation of evidence at trial by the fact finder, including the
demeanor of witnesses. Rather, it was intended as a tool to
mitigate overreaching or provide for executive grace. This
concern has been highlighted and amplified by a handful of
cases providing anecdotal indication that clemency has
been used to second-guess verdicts in cases involving seri-
ous offenses.
In response to these and other arguments, the Congress
amended the Code in 2014 to limit the availability of
clemency as to both findings and sentence based on the
nature of the offense and sentence adjudged. Specifically:
(c) (3) (B) If the convening authority or another person
authorized to act under this section acts on the
findings of a court-martial, the convening
authority or other person—
(i) may not dismiss any charge or specifi-
cation, other than a charge or specifica-
tion for a qualifying offense, by setting
aside a finding of guilty thereto; or
(ii) may not change a finding of guilty to
a charge or specification, other than
a charge or specification for a qualifying
offense, to a finding of guilty to an
offense that is a lesser included offense
of the offense stated in the charge or
specification.
(C) If the convening authority or another person
authorized to act under this section acts on the
findings to dismiss or change any charge or
specification for an offense (other than a qualify-
ing offense), the convening authority or other
person shall provide, at that same time, a written
explanation of the reasons for such action. The
written explanation shall be made a part of the
record of the trial and action thereon.
(D) (i) In this subsection, the term ‘qualifying
offense’ means, except in the case of an
offense excluded pursuant to clause (ii), an
offense under this chapter for which—
(I) the maximum sentence of confinement
that may be adjudged does not exceed
two years; and
(II) the sentence adjudged does not include
dismissal, a dishonorable or bad-
conduct discharge, or confinement for
more than six months.
(ii) Such term does not include any of the
following:
(I) An offense under subsection (a) or (b)
of section 920 of this title (article 120).
[Rape and sexual assault.]
(II) An offense under section 920b or 925
of this title (articles 120b and 125).
[Sexual assault and sodomy.]
(III) Such other offenses as the Secretary
of Defense may specify by regulation.
The question remains, with respect to those offenses not
covered by the terms of the NDAA of 2014, whether the
arguments and purposes for clemency that resulted in its
adoption in 1950, or for that matter, previous Articles of
War, are as relevant and apt in today’s legal context.
B. Guidelines and Consistency
There are no sentencing guidelines in the military justice
system. There are a few mandatory minimums. All of the
offenses in the Code carry maximum sentences. As noted,
military sentencing is predicated on the principle of indi-
vidualized sentencing. That means that servicemembers
convicted of offenses are sentenced based on the nature of
the specific offense(s), including any mitigating and
aggravating factors associated with that offense or that
offender.
As echoed in debates over sentencing guidelines in
Article III Courts and Booker,26 there are similar arguments
for and against the application of guidelines in the military
justice system. To start, individualized sentencing (without
guidelines) recognizes not only that offenses can present
a wide range of disparities in gravity and culpability, as well
as a wide breadth of extenuating and mitigating factors.
Those disparities, the argument goes, can have sufficient
breadth as to make all but the broadest guideline bands
inapt or unfair in context.
Some of these factors are military specific, some not. For
example, in any given case, the offender may express
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a different degree of contrition, or offer a different degree of
rehabilitation potential, or a different level of cooperation to
law enforcement authorities, if any. So, too, a decision to
plead guilty, and thus spare victims the necessity of testi-
fying or the government the expense of trial, may warrant
appropriate sentence adjustment outside fixed sentence
parameters. The fact finder may also assess on an individ-
ual basis different degrees of culpability for the same
offenses. For example, a special defense might apply or
mitigate in one case, but not another.
Military-specific factors may also come to bear and jus-
tify variation in sentence, such as the impact of an offense
on unit morale and capability, whether the offense took
place during combat operations and was shaped by those
operations, or perhaps the role of PTSD on the offender.
It follows that the five sentencing philosophies described
earlier will not apply in the same manner in every case
involving the same offense; their application may vary
widely so as to escape a fair and just application of all but
the widest guideline bands.
Embedded in the debate over guidelines, that is, man-
datory minimums, is an institutional argument about
whether judges or politician-policymakers are best suited to
determine what is a fair and just sentence in a given case,
and whether that judgment should be based on abstract
guidelines or case-contextual factors. In Article III context,
this is a debate over whether the Congress or the judiciary is
better suited to determine fair and just sentences.
As there are arguments against Guidelines in military
and other contexts, there are also arguments for Guidelines
in military context. First, and perhaps foremost, is the
argument that in what is supposed to be a uniform system
of military justice, like sentences should be meted out for
like offenses regardless of service component or grade.
Because military appeals courts and the USCAAF can lower
a sentence, but not increase it, uniformity will only come
through consistent trial practice or with the application of
mandatory minimums and/or guidelines.
Second, and related to this first argument, is the con-
cern regarding the disparate treatment between officers,
especially senior officers, and enlisted personnel. This is
colloquially referred to as ‘‘different spanks for different
ranks.’’ Whether this received wisdom is based on erro-
neous and anecdotal perceptions, or is well-founded and
supportable by empirical data, is beyond the scope and
capacity of this article. However, surely one can conclude
that a system of justice that is perceived to treat offenders
differently based on grade alone will be viewed as a less
credible system than one that treats like offenders in like
manner, and is perceived to do so. Moreover, such per-
ceptions of disparity can affect military morale and
undermine confidence in military leadership.
The debate about guidelines is well known, indeed bet-
ter known to a civilian than a military audience. This article
does not presume to meaningfully add to that debate; rather
the goal is to identify military sentencing factors that might
add to the guideline debate. Here are the takeaways.
As previously noted, the military justice system is
decentralized. This means that statistics, to the extent they
exist, are diffuse and available at the local command or
service level, if at all. Moreover, sentencing statistics do not
exist in context, which means although it may be possible to
graph numerical outcomes, such statistics mean very little
without the accompanying context of victim impact, crime
detail, and mitigating factors, if any.
There is a legal adage that ‘‘bad facts make bad law.’’
Policymakers should take special care when addressing
sentencing in the military context to avoid making deci-
sions based on anecdotal evidence, such as the case where
the rapist or child pornographer received no confinement
or the first-time drug user received thirty years. This is
a subject for which empirical data can especially bring truth
to power. But the data must be accurate and complete.
Better statistics are needed.
Consideration of military sentencing must also account
for the dual purposes of military justice, which is to say,
military discipline and justice and the relationship between
the two. There are military considerations that should factor
into military sentencing that do not factor into civilian
sentencing as both matters of extenuation and mitigation.
For example, although sexual assault is endemic in society
at large, including on college campuses, in the military
context it presents issues not only of victim impact and
justice, but also of good order and discipline. Where sex-
ual assault occurs between servicemembers and/or
involves disparities in grade and power, it also directly
impedes morale and welfare, unit cohesion, and mission
accomplishment. Consider as well the potential range of
appropriate sentencing outcomes from no punishment to
confinement that might occur with reference to adultery,
which is not a criminal offense in most civilian contexts
and rarely prosecuted regardless. In one case, a squad
leader soldier is legally separated from his spouse and
engages in sexual relations with a civilian girlfriend, and
the suspected offense of adultery is reported by a member
of the unit who is resentful for having been assigned
weekend duty. In another case, the squad leader is
deployed to Afghanistan where his leadership proves
essential as a combat patrol leader—that is, until rumors
start circulating in the unit that an officer who has not
deployed with the unit is ‘‘dating’’ the squad leader’s wife.
The rumor is soon confirmed, causing morale in the unit
to plummet and unspoken tension between the unit’s
NCOs and officers. Whether sentencing guidelines might
successfully capture the appropriate range of just options
here is the legal policy question.27 Whether such issues
are better addressed through guidelines, presidential
directives, or case-specific judicial application is the pro-
cess question.
Moreover, the institutional context is different in the
military justice system. As noted above, whereas military
judges do not serve with tenure, they are exposed to
a repetitive practice, especially around certain military and
common law offenses, offering perspective on a normative
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range of sentences. It follows that the longer the tenure, the
deeper the perspective and knowledge.
V. Military Sentencing Nutshells
The two previous sections addressed clemency and sen-
tencing guidelines, or rather the absence of guidelines in
the military context. In this section, the article introduces
five additional sentencing matters that warrant analysis and
review. Perhaps because it would be injudicious to do more
than introduce the topic here, they are presented in nutshell
form. This is not a reflection on their relative importance,
but because the arguments are clearly developed elsewhere,
including in case law.
A. Is the sentencing process fast enough?
Speed, or perhaps in a less pejorative sense, the timely
administration of justice, has long been viewed as
a strength of the military justice system. Among other
things, the timely administration of justice more effectively
serves the sentencing philosophy of deterrence. In the
military context, this means the dual objectives of justice
and good order and discipline. As the saying goes, ‘‘justice
should be seen to be done, as well as done.’’ This is one
reason emphasis is placed on the system’s capacity to
administer justice in deployed environments as well as in
garrison, at sea as well as on land.
Imagine, for example, the effect on unit morale if the
suspected barracks thief remains in the unit because it
takes the convening authority three hundred days to
approve findings and sentence. Likewise, imagine the effect
on the victim of sexual assault who remains in the same
unit with the perpetrator, or where the perpetrator has been
removed to a new unit, but the victim continues to see the
perpetrator on base. Speed matters. It matters even more in
military context, because the perpetrator of an offense and/
or the victim are generally known to the unit, and however
large the unit, everyone knows or at least has a perception
about when and whether ‘‘justice has been done.’’
Aside from the general principle of deterrence, the
question arises, is the sentencing process as fast as it can
be, or should be, consistent with due process, and if not,
where can it improve? Case law and recent Army studies
suggest two areas of concern. First, case law suggests pro-
blems with appellate delay. As Barker v. Wingomakes clear,
where delay is of sufficient duration and impact it raises
due process concerns.28 What military case law makes clear
is that there have been problems with appellate delay in the
military, and some of the problems stem from sentencing
process. In particular, the role of the convening authority in
approving findings and sentence as well as in reviewing for
clemency often adds weeks, months, and sometimes even
years to the court-martial process.29 The question arises,
are there ways of streamlining the posttrial process so that
there are not so many steps. Alternatively, should the Code
or the Rules address slow staff work of the sort that, were it
to occur in an operational setting, would immediately lead
to the relief (firing) of the officer involved.
In addition to raising due process concerns and under-
mining the deterrent effect of courts-martial, appellate delay
combined with personnel law may impact the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by convening authorities by encour-
aging commanders not to pursue criminal charges. In the
military, findings and sentences are not final until appellate
review is complete. Thus, even if a servicemember is sen-
tenced to confinement and a punitive discharge, the punitive
discharge generally is not executed until the appeal is final.
As a matter of personnel law, this has the effect of
encumbering a full-time-equivalent (FTE) position in the
military. Because there is a statutory cap on the number of
personnel each service may carry at any one time, there is
incentive to administratively discharge and immediately
separate a servicemember from the Armed Forces rather
than court-martial the servicemember if a commander
believes that it will take too long for the court-martial pro-
cess to play out. On a service scale the incentive may appear
minimal. With an authorized army active duty end-strength
of 550,064, and 465 and 725 special or general-courts-
martial per year, respectively, it is hard to imagine as
a matter of Army policy that the service would adopt an
Admin Discharge policy for FTE reasons alone, nor has it.
However, on a tactical level, at the regimental or Brigade
level, the incentives might change, where a single soldier or
tens of soldiers may make a difference, especially for
a deploying unit. Indeed, there is some reason to believe
this concern has played out. This is indicated in the Army
Gold Book, compiled under the auspices of the Army Vice
Chief of Staff in 2012.
This analysis, which reflects a significant sample size
and uses population adjusted rates, demonstrates
markedly consistent trends that indicate a potentially
troubling gap in disciplinary accountability. Even
more puzzling is the fact that separations for mis-
conduct have increased by 57% (from 5,606 to 8,815)
in the same period. Simply put, disciplinary account-
ability has reversed its position with administrative
separations from high disciplinary actions and low
administrative separations to low disciplinary actions
and high administrative separations.30
This same incentive might arise in the context of budget
cuts and corresponding personnel cuts.
The questions presented to policymakers are: Is this
concern supported by empirical data? If so, should per-
sonnel or sentencing law be amended so that charging
decisions are made based on the four corners of the evi-
dence presented and not distorted by questions of military
readiness and FTEs? More broadly, policymakers should
ask: Consistent with due process, are there ways to
streamline the process from adjudication to finality? Would
it help to require sentencing by judges alone? What if
judges were given tenure and thus became even more
proficient and practiced in the sentencing process? Does
the array of punishments available for sentencing unduly
delay or confuse the process? For example, is it necessary to
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distinguish between a bad-conduct discharge and a dis-
honorable discharge?
B. How should the collateral consequences of military
justice be addressed in sentencing, if at all?
Military justice sentencing raises a number of issues
regarding the handling of the collateral consequences of
court-martial conviction and sentencing not found in civil-
ian practice. Collateral consequence means an administra-
tive action that is a direct result of a court-martial conviction
or sentence, but that is not itself a punishment adjudged at
court-martial. For example, a punitive discharge adjudged
at court-martial can lead to the loss of retirement pay,
Veterans Administration health benefits, and GI Bill edu-
cational benefits.
In some cases the collateral consequences are the same
in military and civilian context. Within the military system,
however, the subject of ongoing appellate debate continues
regarding how those consequences should be addressed, if
at all, at sentencing. The primary examples are sex-offender
registration and deportation in the case of a noncitizen
convicted of a felony.31
In many cases, an objective observer might well view the
collateral consequence as more severe and permanent than
the sentence adjudged at court-martial. For example, a retire-
ment-eligible servicemember who is convicted of a one-time
use ofmarijuana could face up to five years’ confinement and
a bad-conduct discharge. But if the servicemember is
adjudged a punitive discharge, he or she will also lose retire-
ment benefits. For a 38-year-old E-5 with twenty years of ser-
vice, that would amount to $37,138 per year in base pay.
The legal policy question that arises with respect to good
order and discipline is whether the all-or-nothing loss of
retirement benefits creates incentive, or more precisely
disincentive, for dependents to report offenses in or against
the family. From an anecdotal perspective alone, the
USCAAF has seen numerous cases where families have not
reported or delayed reporting sexual assaults against family
members out of fear that a court-martial conviction will
result in the loss of housing and retirement pay and bene-
fits. There are cases as well involving alleged recantation,
where the facts alleged suggest one parent or another has
realized the impact of a child’s testimony and pressured the
victim-witness to change his or her testimony.
There are two recurring issues that arise on appeal in
military sentencing practice with respect to collateral con-
sequences. First, should a servicemember be permitted to
address the collateral consequences of conviction as part of
his sentencing argument in order to mitigate a potential
court-martial sentence? At court-martial a convicted servi-
cemember is permitted to make an unsworn statement
before the fact finder as a matter of right. Such statements
are generally limited to those relevant to sentencing,
including matters in extenuation, mitigation, and rebuttal.
At the same time, the rules of evidence are relaxed on
sentencing and a servicemember is allowed broad leeway in
what he presents. In addition, the military judge typically
issues a standard Benchbook instruction to Members (a
military judge, like an Article III judge, is presumed to
know the law and apply it), stating that an unsworn state-
ment is not evidence and that it is within the sole discretion
of Members as to how much weight, if any, to give the
statement.
In the case of Talkington, for example, the service-
member sought to bring to the Members’ attention that he
would have to register as a sex offender for the remainder of
his life.32 The government objected, noting that sex
offender registration is a collateral consequence of convic-
tion and not for members to determine as part of their
sentencing. The military judge split the difference and both
instructed the members that it was within their sole dis-
cretion to determine what weight if any to give the defen-
dant’s statement, but at the same time the statement was
fraught with problems and that sex offender registration
was ‘‘not a matter before them.’’
On appeal to the USCAAF the court divided 3–2 on
whether the military judged erred in his instruction. The
three-judge majority of the court concluded the judge had
acted within his discretion because sex offender registra-
tion was a collateral matter, which should not be placed
before members. The two-judge dissent argued that collat-
eral or not, sex offender registration was integral to the
criminal proceeding, would be required by Defense
Department Directive in all fifty states, and thus was an
inexorable and direct result of court-martial conviction.
Thus, rather than have members apply their own received
wisdom and perceptions regarding sex offender registra-
tion without instruction from the judge, the judge should
provide appropriate instruction as tailored in the dissent.
The second recurring issue revolves around the duty of
competent counsel to advise their clients regarding collat-
eral sentencing matters. Is it ineffective assistance of
counsel to fail to affirmatively advise a client regarding the
collateral consequences of court-martial conviction,
including when such collateral consequences are a certain
result of conviction?
Three lines of appellate argument are evident. First, as
a general matter counsel is not required to advise on all
collateral matters, but if they do, the advice rendered must
be accurate. Second, in addressing collateral matters, courts
will distinguish between the impact of collateral matters on
knowing pleas and the impact of such matters on court-
martial sentencing.33 Third, in light of Padilla and other
case law, the distinction between collateral and noncollat-
eral matters on sentencing is not as clear as it once was, and
the law continues to evolve. Whereas some courts and some
circumstances treat collateral matters as integral to the
criminal proceeding where they are a certain result of the
criminal proceeding, other courts and circumstances do
not. Thus, the surest safeguard against confusion or error
on this point is accurate advice and tailored instructions.
In addition, after over a decade of conflict and in many
cases multiple tours of combat duty, policymakers should
consider how veterans benefits, especially health benefits,
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should be treated during the sentencing phase of trial. For
example, as a matter of substance, should a court-martial
conviction lead to the termination of some or all of a service-
member’s benefits, including health benefits? Are, for
example, the interests of justice and society better served by
terminating health benefits in the event of conviction or by
continuing those benefits in a confinement and postconfine-
ment setting where those benefits address battlefield scars of
a physical or mental variety occurring before a soldier’s mis-
conduct? Here the sentencing principle of rehabilitation and
correlated risk of recidivism may come into conflict with
principle of retributive sentencing and victim impact. Should
policy distinguish between health and other benefits?
Depending on the answer to these questions, the sen-
tencing process question becomes, should the parties be
able to argue in sentencing mitigation or aggravation the
loss of veterans’ benefits? In legal terms, should the loss of
health care benefits directed toward service injuries or
consequences be viewed as collateral or a direct conse-
quence of court-martial conviction and thus thrown into the
sentencing deliberative mix?
Of course, the most important collateral consequence of
conviction may be the ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘where’’ of confinement.
C. Military Confinement
As a general matter, servicemembers sentenced to con-
finement pursuant to the military justice system will serve
their sentences in military correctional facilities (MCF).
Sentences to confinement under one year in length will
usually be served in a local confinement facility, e.g., a base
brig, stockade, or prison. In the case of sentences to con-
finement of up to five years in length, servicemembers will
generally serve their sentences at a level II or medium-
security facility, such as those located in Sembach Kaserne,
Germany,34 Charleston, South Carolina, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, Joint Base Lewis-McCord, Washington, and Mira-
mar, California. In the case of sentences of ten years or
longer, confinement will be served at the military’s single
maximum-security facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
which is located adjacent to, but is distinct from, the
medium-security prison at Fort Leavenworth. This is also
the site of military death row. Female prisoners with
lengthy sentences, however, generally serve their time at
the Naval Consolidated Brig, Miramar, in San Diego.35
A number of aspects of military confinement are dis-
tinct from civilian confinement, as suggested in the fol-
lowing mission statement from the Defense Department
Directive governing confinement:
The MCF shall be operated to maintain good order,
discipline, safety, and security. Procedures for oper-
ating facilities, processing prisoners, and conducting
programs shall be uniform to the maximum extent
possible.36
To start, the regulations and the culture contemplate
that at least some confined service personnel will be, or
could be, returned to active duty, and if not active duty,
certainly to civilian life. Thus, both good order and reha-
bilitation are integral to military confinement. In addition,
military prisoners remain subject to the UCMJ under
Article 2 while serving their sentences, even where a sen-
tence includes punitive discharge from the Armed Forces
or where a servicemember has reached the end of his
enlistment. Further, military confinees are invariably first-
time offenders. Otherwise, they likely would not have been
permitted to enlist in the armed forces. Military service also
means they are likely to have a high school education and
that they are persons who at one time took an oath to sup-
port and defend the Constitution.
However, assignment to a military confinement facility is
not a foregone conclusion. DOD Regulations permit the
service of confinement in civilian facilities in two circum-
stances: First, ‘‘[i]f an MCF, including military/security
police detention cells, is not reasonably available, prisoners
may be confined in civilian facilities used by the U.S. Mar-
shals Service. If a facility used or approved by the U.S.
Marshals is not reasonably available, a military prisoner may
be transferred to a facility accredited by the American Cor-
rectional Association (ACA) or facility accredited by the state
in which the prisoner is to be confined.’’37 Further, ‘‘a pris-
oner may be transferred to FBOP facilities with the concur-
rence of or by direction of the appropriate Secretary of the
Military Department concerned . . . and by agreement with
the FBOP.’’38 The potential for transfer can be used as
a source of leverage to maintain good order and discipline
within military confinement facilities. That is because the
received wisdom is that military confinement facilities are
run with military order that keeps the system more safe and
clean than Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prisons.39 Most impor-
tantly, military prisons do not face the serious risks involved
with prison overcrowding that have become a major issue in
some BOP and state prisons in the United States.40
In recent years, the Base Realignment Commission
process has resulted in the consolidation of military cor-
rectional facilities. It is outside the purview of this article to
predict or project whether additional consolidation is likely
or whether additional budget constraints will result in more
frequent recourse to these regulatory permits, allowing the
transfer of military prisoners to civilian facilities. However,
attention to such trends is prudent from those who study
sentencing process and impact.
In general, administrative issues relating to military
confinement are considered collateral matters, and thus
beyond the jurisdiction of military courts and USCAAF
review, either on direct appeal or through habeas petition.
For example, the case law is clear that although ‘‘each
accused deserves individualized consideration on punish-
ment,’’ collateral matters including the possibility of parole
or good-time credit ‘‘should not be considered by the
members or military judge’’ in sentencing.41 However,
appeals do arise regarding the imposition of pretrial or
posttrial confinement where the claim is arguably a direct
product of the court-martial sentence or is otherwise
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governed by a provision of the Code. The jurisdictional fault
line tends to fall between whether confinement conditions
are integral to the sentence of confinement adjudged at
court-martial and therefore a direct result of court-martial
subject to review, and whether confinement questions are
purely postconviction matters and thus entirely collateral to
the jurisdiction of military justice courts.
Appeals addressing the conditions of confinement
generally arise in four related areas. First, Article 13 of the
UCMJ prohibits pretrial punishment.
No person, while being held for trial, may be sub-
jected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or
confinement upon charges pending against him, nor
shall the arrest or confinement imposed upon him
be any more rigorous than the circumstances
required to insure his presence. . . .
Thus, Article 13 prohibits intentional efforts to punish
a soldier while he is pending trial, for example, through
mockery or through duties beyond those ordinarily
assigned to someone of like grade and under like cir-
cumstances. The intent to punish is often decisive in
considering such claims. In addition, the Article is
addressed to the excessive imposition of constraint beyond
that which is necessary under the circumstances. Except in
situations where the government’s intent and behavior
might amount to unlawful command influence, the ordi-
nary recourse after the fact is to seek credit for such
conditions.
Rule for Court Martial 304 expands on Article 13 by
further prohibiting the imposition of pretrial punishment,
and providing that ‘‘prisoners being held for trial shall not
be required to undergo punitive duty hours or training,
perform punitive labor, or wear special uniforms pre-
scribed only for post-trial prisoners.’’ This Rule, which is
generally understood to prohibit the ‘‘comingling’’ of pre-
and posttrial prisoners, is based on the presumption of
innocence and provides further granularity to Article 13.
Second, although a prisoner has no right to determine
his or her place of confinement, the location of confine-
ment may nonetheless arise on appeal in the context of
a plea case. This might occur, for example, where an
accused has entered into a plea agreement on the under-
standing that he or she will be confined under certain
conditions, for example, receive certain counseling or
medical care, or in a certain location. The appellate question
in such circumstance might address whether such a plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made when the condition is
not honored, or cannot be honored after the fact. Among
other things, cases indicate courts might look to whether
a condition is material to the plea, whether the negotiated
conditions are consistent with public policy, and whether
the government’s ability or inability to honor such condi-
tions was known or should have been known at the time. If
called for, the remedy in such instances will likely be
addressed to the providence of the plea.
Third, Article 12 states that ‘‘no member of the armed
forces may be placed in confinement in immediate associ-
ation with enemy prisoners or other foreign nationals not
members of the armed forces.’’ There are not many cases
involving the application of Article 12.42 However, in 2014
the USCAAF held that this provision did not apply only to
detention with enemy prisoners and ‘‘other foreign
nationals,’’ but to foreign nationals generally, including
those within the U.S. Bureau of Prisons system as well as
state and local confinement facilities.43 As there are cur-
rently over 350,000 foreign nationals confined within the
U.S. prison system, it is not yet clear what impact, if any,
this decision will have on the capacity to confine military
prisoners in civilian facilities, what the sanction will be for
doing so, or whether the President or the Congress will
seek to change the law in this area.
Finally, appeals may be taken either on direct review or
through habeas petition asserting that the conditions of
confinement violate a prisoner’s 8th Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment.
D. Should age (ever) serve as a mitigating sentencing
factor?
One topic that has not heretofore arisen in military case law
is whether age should factor into sentencing based on new
understandings about the development of the frontal lobe
of the brain and the impact of such development on the
capacity of individuals to exercise ethical and moral judg-
ment. The law has long recognized a distinction in culpa-
bility between adults and children. What has changed in the
past ten years is our understanding, or at least the under-
standing of neuroscience, about the age at which the cog-
nitive development of the brain’s capacity to exercise ethical
judgment occurs. Research has specifically found that not
only does the frontal lobe undergo more change during
adolescence than any other time of life, but it is also the last
part of the brain that develops. This means ‘‘that even as
[adolescents] become fully capable in other areas, [they]
cannot reason as well as adults.’’44
There is a certain irony here as much of the studies of
the military wounded from the Iraq and Afghanistan con-
flicts focus on the injury to the frontal lobe and its link to
post traumatic stress disorder.45 It might also be noted that
as a matter of international law, but not U.S. law, persons
under the age of 18 are viewed as ‘‘child soldiers.’’ However,
U.S. law permits persons who are 17 years of age to join the
U.S. Armed Forces with informed parental consent.
As brain science has developed over the course of the
past ten years, so has the legal precedent for juvenile sen-
tencing. In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court found
that imposition of the death penalty on juveniles is
unconstitutional.46 Additionally, life without parole cannot
be given to juvenile offenders who committed nonhomicide
offenses.47 In Roper, the Court noted that society now views
juveniles ‘‘as less culpable than the average criminal.’’48
The Court in Graham reaffirmed the Roper reasoning by
discussing the fact that juveniles are simply less culpable,
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and thus, the rationales for both retribution and deterrence,
both bases for punishment, are diminished.49
Most recently, the Supreme Court found that mandatory
schemes for sentencing juveniles are unconstitutional.
Preventing sentencers from considering the age of the
defendant and evaluating the proportionality of the pun-
ishment ‘‘contravenes Graham’s and Roper’s foundational
principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties
on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were
not children.’’50 In that decision, the Supreme Court cited
the progress of brain science, which shows there are
‘‘fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds.’’51 How, if at all, such science and these court
decisions should apply in military context has not been
definitively addressed in a military appellate setting.
E. Death Penalty
The Code currently provides a maximum sentence of death
for fifteen offenses, including certain offenses where the
penalty of death is possible during wartime, but not during
peace. The death penalty is also a listed penalty for certain
offenses for which the underlying offense does not include
the taking of a life, including rape. Indeed, the last person
executed in the military justice system was convicted of rape
and was executed in 1961 at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As of January 2015, there are six
people on military death row at Fort Leavenworth. Each of
these inmates was convicted of one or more murders.
Clearly, any review of sentencing in the military should
include within its gambit consideration of the death pen-
alty. A number of policy issues are evident, including:
• Should there be a death penalty in the military justice
system?
• If so, is the military justice system staffed and
equipped to provide an appropriate level of
representation?
• If adjudged, should a death sentence in fact be
executed?
• Does a military death penalty serve its intended pol-
icy purposes?
There are also a number of legal questions that will, in
context, need to be addressed by the military justice system
relating to due process and the Code’s consistency with
current Supreme Court precedent. However, these ques-
tions are more appropriately and judiciously addressed
elsewhere, including in the articles that follow. The purpose
of this brief section is therefore to expressly recognize the
death penalty as belonging on the list of military sentencing
matters warranting review and discussion, without search-
ing for or crossing the line as to what is or is not judicious
commentary.
VI. Conclusion
This article introduced the reader to the nature and process
of court-martial sentencing. It also identified some of the
legal policy issues associated with that process, which
issues prompt the questions: Is military justice, including
sentencing, on the march? If so, to where is it marching?
The answer depends on a number of questions
addressed in these issues of the Federal Sentencing Reporter.
1. What are the purposes of military justice
sentencing?
2. Does current law effectively promote and support
those purposes? Does the substance and process of
military sentencing promote justice as well as good
order and discipline?
3. Is military justice sentencing fast enough? If not,
why not? Can changes be made to speed the pro-
cess, consistent with due process?
4. Is military justice sentencing uniform, predictable,
just, and fair?
Specific questions should follow from these threshold
framework questions, including:
1. Should military judges have tenure?
2. Should the UCMJ adopt sentencing guidelines?
3. Should members or judges alone adjudicate
sentences?
4. What role should victims play in the sentencing
process, and are there sound legal or policy reasons
why that role should differ from civilian practice?
5. Should commanders continue to exercise Article 60
clemency, and if so, at what level of command and
in regard to what type of offenses?
Regardless of the answer to these questions, it is clear
that a better informed policy outcome will occur with more
reliable data. Therefore, regardless of one’s answers to
these questions, the Congress and the President should
consider the manner in which statistics are kept and on
what subjects. Such data will permit policymakers to leg-
islate on the basis of empirical evidence as opposed to
anecdotal or emotional response.
It will also better occur with the benefit of external
comment and oversight that comes from having an active
and interested academic bar address today’s topics. In this
regard the Federal Sentencing Reporter and the articles that
follow are making an important contribution to public
policy and military justice.
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